Ben Sira on the Free Will Problem: A Comparison with Chrysippus

Updated by: 
Shlomo Brand
Research notes: 
SB/not checked/07/10/2021
Reference type: 
Journal Article
Author(s): 
Li, Xi
year: 
2021
Full title: 

Ben Sira on the Free Will Problem: A Comparison with Chrysippus

Journal / Book Title || Series Title: 
Harvard Theological Review
Volume: 
114
Issue / Series Volume: 
3
Abbreviated Series Name: 
HTR
Place of Publication: 
Cambridge
Publisher: 
Cambridge University Press
Pages: 
328-345
Work type: 
Non review
Abstract: 

This article deals with the similarities and differences between Ben Sira and Chrysippus regarding their solutions to the tension between free will and determinism. Both Ben Sira and Chrysippus argue for compatibilism, the theory that free will and determinism are compatible. However, Ben Sira and Chrysippus have different understandings of freedom required by moral responsibility. According to Chrysippus, consent is the internal cause of persons’ actions, and, thus, they should be responsible for these actions. By contrast, Ben Sira claims that although being shaped by God’s plan, persons could have done otherwise and, in this sense, are responsible for their sins. The first section of this article examines the texts of Ben Sira and Chrysippus regarding the problem of free will. The second section discusses the positions of Ben Sira and Chrysippus on compatibilism. The last section explains the possible influence of Chrysippus on Ben Sira and the main difference between their understandings of freedom.

Primary Texts: Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha: 
Composition / Author: 
Ben Sira
URL: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/harvard-theological-review/article/ben-sira-on-the-free-will-problem-a-comparison-with-chrysippus/F22EF99BFABE3DFB0630C553393F208F
Label: 
11/10/2021
Record number: 
107 993